THE CONSTITUTION OF CODE: LIMITATIONS ON CHOICEBASED CRITIQUES OF CYBERSPACE REGULATION
Lawrence Lessig*

Behavior in real space is regulated by three
sorts of constraints.' Law is just one of these three
constraints. Law tells individuals not to deduct
more than 50% of the cost of business meals from
their income tax; it tells corporations not to resist
unionization; it tells police not to coerce confessions from suspects. In this way, we say, law regulates.
But not only law regulates. Social norms also
regulate. Norms are a second sort of constraint.
Norms say I can buy a newspaper, but cannot buy
a friend. They frown on the racist's jokes, and are
unsure about whether a man should hold a door
for a woman. In far more contexts of our life
than law, norms constrain behavior. Norms, in
this sense, too, regulate.
And finally there is (for want of a better word
just now) nature. 2 It is the third of these constraints, and it too regulates. That I can not see
through walls is a constraint on my ability to
snoop. That I can not read your mind is a constraint on my ability to know whether you are telling me the truth. That I can not lift large objects
is a constraint on my ability to steal. Nature, in
these ways, constrains behavior. Nature, in this
sense, regulates.
These all are constraints on behavior. But how
each constraint achieves its effect is different.
Law and norms achieve their effects through the

centralized punishment (police, prosecutors, and
courts), norms threatening decentralized punishment (neighbors and busybodies). But nature
achieves its effect more directly. One doesn't
choose not to see through a brick wall for fear of
the punishment that nature will visit upon such
an infraction. One simply cannot see through a
brick wall. One doesn't choose not to lift an elephant for fear of the ex post sanction if one does.
One simply cannot lift an elephant. We live life
subject to the constraints of nature; we live life
choosing whether to obey the constraints of laws,
or norms.3
Most regulation talk focuses on law among
these regulating constraints. The reasons are not
surprising. Law is the most obvious regulatory
constraint. It is that regulatory constraint over
which we seem to have the greatest control. Law
seems most plastic: statutes make the law, and
statutes are written; judges interpret the law, and
judges could interpret differently. Both facts focus us on law as a regulator. Reformists of both
the right and the left ask how law can be made to
regulate better.
This last decade in legal scholarship has seen
this focus shift somewhat. The work of Ellickson
and others has drawn attention to how norms
might regulate.4 The question has been first, does
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I Or at least three sorts of constraints. I am not claiming
that there are no other constraints. Psychology or the market, for example, are constraints which are related to these
three primary constraints in complex ways.
2
By "nature" I don't mean constraints that are not man

made. A better, if more clumsy construction, would be nature and architecture. As the discussion will suggest, I mean
just to point to physical constraints in life, whether man
made or not. These are constraints that define a physical environment. Obviously some of such constraints are man
made; some not.
3 This is not to say that the constraints of nature cannot
be changed. The car blocking my driveway is a constraint in
the sense I mean here; obviously, however, that constraint
can be changed. Constraints of nature can be plastic or not,
just as constraints of law or norms can be plastic or not.
4 See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAw:
How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (Harvard Univ. Press)
(1991).
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law determine norms, and second, and if not,
then how do norms regulate, and what makes
them as they are. A surprisingly rich literature has
now grown up around this question, much of it
skeptical of the efforts of governments to regulate
or to affect norms,5 but little skeptical of the idea
that norms are real, and that norms are regulating. 6
But modem legal scholarship has not thought
much about how nature regulates. We take nature as we find it. There are important exceptions: Roberto Unger among critical legal scholars developed a powerful language for thinking
about how what functions as nature regulates. 7
Outside law, this is Michel Foucault's focus as
well." And historically, thought about how nature
regulates was quite pronounced - from the focus
of the framers on how geography would help define the ideal republic,9 to the attention that architects in France paid to the design of public
streets as a way to break up the resistance.10 But
these examples aside, our modern attention
within law to how nature regulates has been quite
thin. For the most part, we take nature as given,
assume norms are unmanageable, and then ask,
how much, or how should, law regulate?
This traditional order is about to change. It is
about to invert. We are entering an age where the
most important questions will not be how law constrains, but how nature should constrain. We are
entering a time when the most difficult questions
are not the questions of how far law should go,
but how far nature can be made to support law.
When the questions are not what norms there are,
but how far nature can be made to make norms as
they should be. Our focus is about to shift from
the most obvious locus of self-conscious, and activist regulation, to the least obvious locus of selfconscious and activist regulation; from a focus on
the direct constraints of law, to the indirect constraints that law is able to effect.
Cyberspace will effect this shift. My aim in this
short essay is to suggest how. I begin with a sketch
of two kinds of regulation (what I call direct and

indirect). Both are regulations, but my argument
will be that the second, indirect regulation, is
about to become something much more significant. Indirect regulation is about to become
more significant both because direct regulation
will become less effective, and because the technologies of indirect regulation will become more
effective. Or again, the regulatory return from direct regulation is about to fall, while the return
from indirect regulation will rise quite dramatically.
This will lead then to a second aim of this essay,
more directly trained on Mr. Corn-Revere's chapter of the book that is the subject of this conference. 1 His work is an embrace of a kind of free
speech libertarianism. This argument goes something like this: We have entered a time when the
"culture of regulation" is strong. It manifests itself
a wide range of areas, most forcefully, and problematically, in the area of content regulation of
speech. Traditional protections against such content regulation have yielded to a siren: that this
space, at this time, is different. Traditional protections have checked out, while we find our bearings in this new age. But we should move immediately back to the world where speech was
unregulated, or at least to where regulations of
content were exceptionally rare. That is the world
we have left, Corn-Revere argues, and it is the
world to which we should return.
There is much in this picture of libertarianism
that is attractive. There is much that resonates
with our constitutional past. But I want to argue
that the picture is incomplete, and the distinction
the first section draws between direct and indirect
regulation will suggest why. This incompleteness,
some have argued, was always present. It is about
to become unavoidable. And once we complete
what libertarianism leaves out, much of the "regulation" that Corn-Revere attacks turns out to be
regulation that the libertarian should embrace.
This, in turn, will teach us something about libertarianism, and something about the nature of
what regulation is becoming.

5 See id. (this was Ellickson's implicit view); cf Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norns and Social Roles, 96 CoLum. L. Rrv.
903 (1996) (stating that government has a large role in norm
management).
6 Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995).
7 See generally ROBERTO M. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS
SITUATION AND ITS TASK (Cambridge Univ. Press) (1987).

8 See, e.g., MICHEL FouCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH
(Vintage Books) (1977).
9 Federalist No. 10 (James Madison) (how geography
can help to define the ideal republic).
10 See DAVID H. PICKNEY, NAPOLEON III AND THE REBUILDING OF PARIS (1958).
11 ROBERT CORN-REVERE,

TIONS ch. 1 (1997).
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I. REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE
I said at the start that behavior in real space is
regulated by three sorts of constraints (law,
norms, and nature) and that the way law and
norms regulate is different from the way that nature regulates.
Behavior in cyberspace is regulated in just the
same way:
* First, law regulates behavior in cyberspace.
Copyright law, defamation laws, and obscenity
laws all continue to threaten ex post sanction for
the violation of some legal right. How well, or
how efficiently, is a separate question. In some
cases more efficiently, in some cases not. But
whether better or not, law continues to threaten
an expected and negative return, and this in ways
not much differently from real space. Legislatures enact; 12 prosecutors threaten;1 3 courts convict.14
* Second, norms regulate behavior in cyberspace: talk about democratic politics in the
<alt.knitting> newsgroup, and you open yourself
to flaming; "spoof' someone's identity in a MUD,
and you might find yourself toaded; talk too
much in a discussion list, and you're likely to be
placed on a common bozo filter. In each case,
there is a set of understandings that constrain behavior in this space, again through a threat of ex
post (though decentralized) sanctions.
* Third and finally, an analog to nature, code,
regulates behavior in cyberspace. The code, or
the software that makes cyberspace as it is, constitutes a set of constraints on how one can behave
The ACLU lists 11 states that passed Internet regulations in 1995 and 1996. (visited Apr. 22, 1997) <http://
www.aclu.org/ issues/cyber/censor/stbills.html#bills>.
13 See, e.g., Minnesota Attorney General Office's Internet Policy, (visited Apr. 22, 1997) <http://
www.state.mn.us/ebranch/ ag/memo.txt>.
14 See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g,
1996 US Dist Lexis 8435 (S.D. N.Y. 1996); United States v.
Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
15 For example, online services such as America Online.
16
USENET postings can be anonymous.
17
Web browser's make this information available, both
in real time, and archived in a cookie file.
18 Web browsers also permit users to turn this tracking
feature off.
19 Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is a program to encrypt
messages. SeeJason Kerben, Comment, TheDilemmafor Future
Communication Technologies: How to Constitutionally Dress the
Crypto-Genie, 5 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 125 (Winter 1997).
20
See Comments of Ambassador David Aaron, (visited
Apr. 22, 1997) <http://www.bxa.doc.gov /aaron.htm> (Encryption, for example, is illegal in some international con12
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in cyberspace. The substance of these constraints
vary, but they are experienced as conditions on
one's access to cyberspace. In some places, one
must enter a password before one gains access;' 5
in other places, one can enter whether identified
or not.16 In some places, the transactions that one
engages produce traces that link the transactions
(the mouse droppings) back to the individual;17
in other places, this link is achieved only if one
wants. 18 In some places, one can select to speak a
language that only the recipient can hear
(through encryption); 19 in other places, encryption is not an option. 2 0 The code or software or
architecture or protocols set these features; they
are features selected by code writers; they constrain some behavior by making other behavior
possible, or impossible. They too are regulations. 21
In this sense, then, law, norms and code regulate cyberspace just as law, norms and nature (or
what I call "real space code") regulate real space.
But there is an important difference between
these two regimes. In real space, constraints are
changed by changing law; in cyberspace, constraints will be changed by changing code.2 2 This
will follow because of two features of these two different worlds: First: In real space, it is law that is
plastic; in cyberspace, it is code that is plastic.
And second: In real space, it is relatively hard to
escape the constraints of law; in cyberspace, it is
much easier.2 3 The effect of both differences will
be to shift the locus of regulatory change from law
to code. In real space, law is at center stage, and
texts).

21 Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911 (1996); David Johnson &
David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REv. 1367 (1996).
22 This is not the architecture of the net as is it right now.
Today, rich code regulation is not possible. This is, however,
the direction that I believe the code is moving. See Lawrence
Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 45 STAN. L. RiEv. 1403 (1996).
23 The argument that law is relatively less effective in
cyberspace than in real space is well known, and in my view,
too strongly made. It is true that, given architectures of the
space as they exist just now, law is at a disadvantage. But it
doesn't follow from this that law couldn't force code to be
structured such that law would be more effective. But I put
to one side the question of how effective law could be made.
It is still true that code will be relatively more effective, or
efficient. And it is this comparative advantage that I want to
consider. See David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An
Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3.
Par. 4 (1995) (on the weakness of law in code space).
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code is an afterthought. In cyberspace, the game
is code. Law is a side-show.
This difference is more than a difference in efficiency. The question is not just which achieves a
collective end more cheaply. The difference is
also a difference in how law and code regulate.
Law (and norms) regulates mediately, through
the threat of ex post sanction, while code, in constructing a social world, regulates immediately.
We live life subject to the code, as we live life subject to nature. Just as we do not choose whether
to see through a wall or not, we don't choose
whether to enter America Online without giving
our password. Superman might choose whether
to see through a wall; and hackers might be able
to choose whether to enter AOL with a password.
But we are neither supermen nor hackers (if such
a distinction exists). We live life subject to the
constraints of code, however (and by whomever)
these constraints have been set.
Code then regulates then as nature regulates.
It has the power of nature and is experienced as
nature. And yet, code is more plastic than nature.
It functions as a kind of naturalized politics. It is a
way to codify political choice, or a way to more
quickly move political choice into the background. It is a mechanic for social construction for it is obviously a construction, and it plainly defines the social world that lives life subject to it.
But it constructs a social world differently from
how norms, or law, constructs a social world. Not
necessarily worse, or better, just differently.
This difference forces a choice on us that in
real space we ordinarily ignore. If behavior is regulated by these three sorts of constraints, then in
principle we could substitute one constraint for
another - substitute, for example, a law constraint
for a norm constraint; or a norm constraint for a
code constraint; or a code constraint for a law
constraint, and so on. With real space regulation,
because norms and real space code are relatively
nonplastic, we don't think much about this tradeoff. 2 4 In cyberspace, however, the trade-off is una24 There are important exceptions. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133
(1996) (examining the costs of trading norm constraints for
law constraints); See also BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
THE LIBERAL STATE (1980) (a theory of social justice predicated upon a technology that could substitute code constraints for law constraints).
25 Johnson & Post, supra note 21.
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voidable.
In cyberspace, because code is so plastic and so
powerful, and because law is so feeble and (on an
international scale) so rigid, code has a comparative regulatory advantage over law. A gap in legal
regulation will therefore emerge, and code will fill
that gap. Structures of regulation get codified in
the architecture of the net, and these structures of
regulation entail important values choices.
Whether information will be kept private,
whether encrypted speech is allowed, whether anonymity is permissible, whether access is open and
free - these are all policy choices made by default
by a structure of code that has developed - unaware at times, and, generally, uncritically of the
politics that code entails.
Some argue that this shows that government
should simply get out of the way. That government should let code regulate, and defer to its
regulations in this space. 25 But this is quite unlikely. We shouldn't expect government simply to
cede jurisdiction over cyberspace to Barlowtypes. 26 Instead, government will shift to a different regulatory technique. Rather than regulating
behavior directly, government will regulate indirectly. Rather than making rules that apply to
constrain individuals directly, government will
make rules that require a change in code, so that
code regulates differently. Code will become the
government's tool. Law will regulate code, so that
code constrains as government wants.27
There are then two techniques for regulating
cyberspace - direct and indirect - and to-date,

governments have adopted both techniques.
Some laws regulate behavior directly. States, for
example, are making it a crime to utter fighting
words on the Internet, or making it a crime to
gamble on the Internet.28 But more and more
frequently, governments regulate indirectly, by
either requiring that code be modified in some
way to achieve a preferred primary behavior, or by
inducing norms governing cyberspace to favor a
preferred behavior. Some proposals embrace
26 See John Perry Barlow's, Declaration of Independence
for Cyberspace, (visited Apr. 22, 1997) <http://www.eff.
org/pub/Publications/JohnPerryBarlow/barlow_0296.
declaration>.
27 Another way to view this is law regulating
norms, so
that norms constrain as government wants.
28
Minnesota, for example. See Minnesota Attorney
General Office's Internet Policy, supra note 13.
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both techniques. The government's White Paper
on Intellectual Property, for example, speaks of
law regulating differently, and of law regulating
norms, and code, so that norms and code regulate differently. 29 But the trend, I suggest, will be
towards indirect regulation, an in the section that
follows, I give examples of how.
II.

INDIRECTION IN CYBERSPACE

My claim so far has been simply descriptive.
I've distinguished among the constraints of law,
norms, and code, and I've distinguished between
the direct regulations of law, and the indirect regulation (by law) of law, and norms, and code.
This latter distinction we can represent graphically as in Figure 1: the three boxes represent the
three types of constraint that I have described. In
the center is the resulting constraint of the three.
Law, norms, and code each have a direct effect;
that effect is represented by the arrows within the
three boxes. But law can also have an effect on
code, or norms, represented by the arrows outside
the three boxes. The arrows outside represent indirect regulation; the arrows within, direct.

This topology maps real space regulation. It maps
cyberspace regulation as well. But its proportions
in cyberspace are quite different from its proportions in real space. For again, the possibility of
regulation through code in cyberspace is far
greater than the possibility of regulation through
code in real space. And the possibility of regula29 The regulation of norms is through educational programs, that are designed to increase the stigma associated
with the theft of intellectual property. The regulation of
code is through laws that make code-breaking code illegal,
and through encouragement of the development of intellectual property protecting code, such as encryption, or digital
signatures. See Bruce A. Lehman, The Report of the Working
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tion through law in cyberspace is far less than in
real space.s 0 Thus cyberspace will make more salient questions about how code regulates, and
more critical questions about how law regulates
code.
For law now plainly regulates code. Consider
just three examples drawn from the work the last
two Congresses: Each aims to regulate cyberspace
indirectly, by regulating code directly:

A.

Digital Telephony Act

The first examples is Congress' recent Digital
Telephony Act.3 1 As telephone networks have
moved from analog to digital, and as switching
technologies have moved from central switching
to distributed, this change (in the code regulating
networks) has had an important consequence for
law enforcement. No longer is there a predictable path through which a telephone call will
pass, and hence no longer is it an easy matter to
tap a phones on a digitally switched network.
This is so, at least, with one version of the architecture of a digitally switched telephone network.
Other versions of that architecture are less difficult
to tap. The architecture of telephone networks
could be designed either to make it "wire-tap accessible" or "wire-tap inaccessible." The difference is simply a choice of code. And whatever
code is chosen, plainly values of privacy or evasion
are implicated by the code.
The Digital Telephony Act is a choice about
those values. It required that telephone companies select a network architecture that facilitates
wiretapping. It required, that is, a code that facilitated the government's objective of being able to
tap when it had authority to tap. The government
chose this mode of regulation over another that
was certainly available - the government could,
that is, have simply increased punishments to
overcome the loss in enforcement ability. But its
choice was different, and this no doubt because of
the values at stake.
This is law regulating code. It is a regulation
Group on Intellectual Property Rights (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) Sept. 1995.
30 Johnson & Post, supra note 21.
31 Digital Telephony Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-414,
108 Stat. 4279. See also Susan Freiwald, UncertainPrivacy, 69
So. CAL. L. REv. 949 (1996) (discussing the Digital Telephony Act).
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designed to reduce the constraints that code
might create for law enforcement. Its indirect effect is therefore to improve law enforcement. But
it does that by modifying possible code based constraints on law enforcement. It selects a code that
distributes the burdens of code in a collectively
valued way.
B.

Communications Deceny Act

The second example is the Communications
Decency Act. ("CDA")3 2 In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress enacted restrictions
on the production of indecency on the net.
These restrictions are of a mixed sort. The
prohibitions of the CDA are really paired prohibitions - there is, on the one hand, the banning of
indecent speech on the net, and, on the other
hand, the permission to speak indecently if one
implements a reasonably effective screening technology. The first part of this pair is direct regulation - its a legal ban on primary conduct, backed
up by the threat of punishment; the second is indirect regulation - the definition of a safe haven
for indecent speech, implemented through code.
How then should we understand, or characterize,
the two parts combined?
In my view, we should read the two parts together as an indirect regulation of code. Like the
Digital Telephony Act, the statute in effect regulates the architecture of the net. It mandates a
technology that facilitates discrimination based
on age. It is, in effect, a zoning statute.3 3 It says
that those who want to speak indecently must do
so in a particular space - behind electronic
screens. The statute is a jobs program for cyberscreen technologies. If it were upheld, we can expect the code of cyberspace to be modified, to
better facilitate the government's aim to screen
indecency from kids.
C.

The V-Chip

Also within the Telecommunications Act of
1996 was the V-chip regulation.3 4 Said Congress,
television manufacturers and media producers
32

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,

§ 230, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West Supp.
1996)).
33 This is now the government's argument in the ACLU
v. Reno case. See Brief for the United States, ACLU v. Reno,
929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (No. 96-511); see also Law-
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must develop a technology to rate broadcasting
on television, so that individuals at home can
choose to block what they don't want to see. In
the most obvious sense imaginable, this too is an
indirect regulation through code. It says that televisions must have built-in a code that facilitates
discrimination on the part of consumers of television broadcasting. And it does this to advance the
aim of the government - that parents be empowered to discriminate.
I find it interesting that this provision didn't
raise much constitutional concern, though just
why I think that I will defer for the moment.
What is important now is just to see the relationship between the CDA and the V-chip. Both are
code regulations. They both mandate a certain
architecture of code. They both mandate that architecture as a way to facilitate discrimination on
the part of the consumer. Both aim, that is, to
reduce the costs of discrimination on the part of
the consumer. The CDA mandates just one dimension of discrimination - based on age. The Vchip, in principle, mandates a technology with an
open ended array of discriminations - based on
violence, or sex, or family values. Or again, the
CDA codifies just one type of discriminatory default, different from where it is just now (it codifies that is the default that children can't get access to indecency), while the V-chip codifies an
open ended list of discriminatory defaults.
These three acts by the 103d and 104th Congress, then, are three examples of indirect regulation through the regulation of code. How should
we evaluate such regulation? Is code regulation
more suspect than law regulation? Or more
pointedly, can libertarians be as consistent in
their opposition to code regulation as they are to
law regulation? Is all of this just "regulation" and
therefore all subject to the same anti-regulatory
libertarian attack?
That is the sense one gets from Mr. Corn-Revere's chapter. It sketches a picture of regulation
as disease. "Censorship is contagious," Mr. CornRevere writes, and we have apparently caught the
contagion. We were promised, in the mid-1980s,
"a full recovery" from this disease, but now all
rence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY

L.J. 869, 883-95 (1996).
34 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 551, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West
Supp. 1996)).
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signs threaten a relapse. If the "First Amendment
is the immune system," then, Mr. Corn-Revere
warns, this "culture of regulation" threatens free
society as "the AIDS crisis" threatens the body.
Cyberspace, we are told, is becoming a new medium "to spread the disease."
This is scary stuff, but I wonder whether the libertarian should be scared. I wonder more precisely whether a libertarian can that think that all
such regulation is disease. I want to argue that he
or she cannot: That some of the regulation that
Mr. Corn-Revere attacks is regulation that the libertarian should embrace. Or alternatively, that if
there is reason to attack, it is not reason grounded
in libertarianism.
My argument follows from the distinction that I
have drawn between direct and indirect regulation. We can see the point by focusing on the last
two examples of regulation that I described above
- the CDA and the V-chip. In the first, Congress
is mandating one dimension of discrimination in
the architecture of the net; in the second, Congress is mandating an open ended list of discriminations in the architecture of the net. In the
CDA, it is requiring that the net screen by age; in
the V-chip, it is mandating that the v-net screen by
violence, and sexuality, and any number of other
attributes yet to be determined. The first is a very
simple, maybe crude discrimination; the second
has the potential to be quite sophisticated and
subtle. (On the Web, some versions imagine programs being rated by competing rating organizations, and viewers then able to select the rating
system they want imposed35 ).
But whether simple or sophisticated, the impor-
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cess to these sites; for most, then, want to have access blocked, but those who want to give their kids
access would, presumably, still have that right.3 6
The V-chip does this even more. It establishes a
filtering device that gives views increased control
over what kinds of television is displayed on their
television. The result of this will be a broader
range of television broadcasting, and a greater
ability for viewers to select what they wanted to
see. 37
To the extent that these regulations simply increase consumer choice, why should a libertarian
oppose them? Without these regulations, it would
be harder for consumers to get what they want;
with these regulations, it becomes easier. Without
these regulations, cyberspace is an undifferentiated, unzoned world; with these regulations, individuals can navigate the space without exposure
to what they don't want to see. These are regulations that rationalize the space, in the way a map
rationalizes real space. They are about facilitating
individual power, against forces the individual
can't otherwise control. They are freedom enhancing, not freedom reducing.
The libertarian might respond, however, by distinguishing between the regulations that code
yields, and the regulation of code. She might say,

tions of the defaults of the net, and given fairly
uncontroversial assumptions about what "most
people want," both have the effect of giving cyberspace users greater control by setting the defaults
to the choice most would select. The CDA does
this by setting a default against access to adults
sites; that default increases the control of consumers, assuming that most would want to block ac-

that is, that it is OK that code regulates; but not
OK for government to regulate the code. The
problem is regulation, whether direct, or indirect,
not constraint.
This view might make sense in a relatively stable
environment, where it expresses a mildly conservative view against further regulation of given,
and constant, constraints. But it makes no sense
in a context where the constraint themselves have
undergone a radical change.
Imagine that a virus (to continue Corn-Revere's
metaphor) wiped out the human race's ability to
act according to social norms - that overnight, we
simply lost that sense of what was appropriate socially, and the attitude to conform to that view. In
this world, one of the three constraints that I have
described (law, norms, and code) has disappeared, and the question is whether law, or code,

See, for example, the PICS System (last visited May 6,
35
1997) <http://www.W3.org/pub/www/pics>.
36
One question not pressed in the present litigation is
whether a parent has the right to make indecent material
available to his or her kid, the CDA notwithstanding. A plain
reading of the statute says not, but one might imagine that
an implied parental exception is understood here. On prin-

ciples analogous to the decision in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116 (1958), we might believe Congress would have to speak
more clearly if it intended to invade parental rights like this.
37
See J. M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of BroadcastRegulation, 45 DuKE L. J. 1131 (1996); cf
Malcolm Gladwell, Chip Thrills, NEW YORKER,Jan. 20, 1997, at
7.

tant point is this: That both regulations are regulations that increase consumer power. Both are regula-

COMMELAW CONSPECTUS

188

should fill the gap created by this virus. Should
new structures compensate for the collapse in
constraint brought about by this elimination of
the constraint of norms?
My sense here is that the conservative would
support regulation aimed at reestablishing the
balance of constraint that existed prior to the infection. And that rather than viewing this regulation as disease (as again Mr. Corn-Revere's essay
does), he might view this regulation as therapy for
a disease. It would be regulation aimed at restoration, not regulation aimed at change.
If you buy this picture with respect to the virus,
then I think you are not far from the picture with
respect to cyberspace today. For just as my hypothetical virus was imagined to erase the constraints of norms, so too should we see cyberspace
today as a place that has erased the constraints of
code (meaning real space code). For think again
about the regulation of, say, porn - not the regulation against the consumption of porn, but the
real world regulations that exist now to assure that
porn is not distributed to kids.
Some of that regulation comes from law - not
much, but some. Some communities, for example, pass laws that ban the sale of porn to kids;
some pass laws that require IDs before porn can
be sold; some pass laws that require the presence
of a parent before a kid can see porn.38
But most of the regulation of the sale of porn to
kids comes from norms, and code: Norms that
regulate sellers of porn (economic interests not
withstanding), and code that makes it hard for a
kid to hide his age, or hard for a kid to travel to
the area of a city where porn is sold, or hard for a
kid to fake an ID that would make it possible for
porn to be sold to him. These constraints of
norms and code combine in real space with the
constraints of law, and constitute a regime of regulation that limits the sale of pornography to kids.
Cyberspace changed all that. There were still
the regulations of law, and let's assume there were
as well the regulations of norms. What changed,
however, was the regulation of code. Now, because a kid could easily hide his age, code didn't
facilitate discrimination in the sale of porn to
kids. And now, because it was easy to travel in
cyberspace, the code constraint of distance no
longer facilitated discrimination in the sale of
38
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porn to kids. What cyberspace did - much as the
virus in my hypothetical does - was erase the constraints of code on the distribution of pornography, and thereby erase constraints that facilitated
discrimination in the sale of pornography.
The CDA tries to rebuild part of this code. It
tries by requiring that the architecture of the
space reestablish some of the constraints of real
space, to facilitate discrimination in the distribution of porn. And given this reconstruction, it is
at least a question whether we should consider
this new regulation, or simply the re-establishment
of an old regime. For if this is the re-establishment of a regime of constraint that existed before
cyberspace began, then a view that does not in
general oppose constraint needs a stronger argument to resist this sort of re-restraint. Put another
way, if the ground for libertarianism is a resistance
to new regulation, and if the regulation of the
CDA is nothing new, then something more is
needed to resist the CDA.
Whether one buys my argument about the CDA
or not, it should be clear that some regulation of
code is choice enhancing rather than choice disabling. And so the question about this must be,
about what can the individual complain? Or
more directly, about what can the libertarian complain?
III.

COMPLAINTS ABOUT CHOICE

In the last section I argued that regulations like
the CDA and V-chip are regulations of code. And
I argued as well that the effect of these regulation
of code was to increase individual choice. These
were regulations that gave the individual more
power to exclude, by giving the individual more
power to filter. What principle of libertarianism
gives us a reason to resist such regulation?
My sense is that none does: That there is no
principle of libertarianism that would resist regulations that enhance individual choice, for in my
read at least, libertarianism isjust that philosophy
aimed at maximizing the scope for individual
choice. If there is a reason then to resist regulations such as the CDA, or V-chip, the reasons must
find their ground outside of libertarianism.
What would that ground be? I don't think we
have a well developed tradition for speaking of
Press) (1996). The ground for this regulation was affirmed
in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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such a regime. We have flashes of it within our
constitutional tradition, but these flashes have
been unified only in the work of academics. In
that domain, the tradition is the tradition that
Sunstein speaks of as Madisonian.39 It is a tradition that asserts a state interest to muck around
with individual choice about speech, so as to assure a mix of speech in the speech market that
serves democratic ends. 40 It is a tradition that resists the principle of consumer sovereignty; a tradition that considers the implied aggregation
from individual consumer choice just one possible aggregation of social preferences; 4 1 and that
therefore reserves a question about the allocations that are achieved by regimes that perfect individual choice. 42
From this perspective, there are obvious questions about the regime of choice that this code is
producing. My claim is that the code is developing to facilitate individual power to screen speech
automatically. This, I suggest, is something new.
The individual is not confronted with the speech,
and then forced to choose not to listen; the individual instead programs her v-, or e-machine, and
that program does the screening for her. The system becomes a faithful butler, answering the
door, and politely pushing the unwanted along. 43
And as the requirements for enabling filtering increase, we can imagine that the sophistication of
this filtering will increase as well.
How should we think about such intelligent
agents? We have had analogs in American constitutional history that might provide a clue. These
analogs were no doubt crude, but they functioned
in the same way. They were orders that screened
delivery of information on the basis of content.
And the question the Supreme Court has addressed in the three cases that have reviewed such
technologies was how broadly this screening
power could be extended or facilitated by the government. Or alternatively, what constitutional
principle might limit this power to screen.
The three cases that come closest to answering

this question raise as many questions as they answer. The first was Lamont v. PostmasterGeneral of
the United States.4 4 The question in Lamont was the
constitutionality of a statute that required the recipient of communist mail sent from a foreign address to indicate that he wanted to receive such
mail, by returning a post card sent to him by the
post office. If within twenty days, that card was
not returned, then it was presumed that the recipient did not want to receive the mail, and that
mail, and all similar mail, would from that moment on not be delivered.4 5
The Court struck the statute, but the opinion
that give the reasoning its most salient twist is a
concurring opinion by Justice Brennan. 46 While
Brennan saw no problem in allowing the recipient
to request that no further mail from a particular
address be delivered, Brennan thought that restriction permissible only because the sender had
had, as it were, one bite at the apple. Even if the
individual by default didn't want to receive any
communist mail, the sender had a right, Brennan's opinion suggests, to send at least one
message through the mail. After that one
message, the recipient could use the state to shut
off further communication; but before that one
chance, he could not.4 7
Brennan's reasoning is consistent with the second opinion arguably relevant here - Rowan v.
United States Post Office.48 The issue in Rowan was a
regulation that permitted addressees to tell the
post-office to block the delivery of indecent material in the mails. Parallel to the CDA, the statute
was defended on the same grounds as the CDA:
to protect children from this indecent material. 4 9
The question was whether this sort of protection
(of children) interfered too much with the rights
of adults.
The Court upheld the statute, but read it quite
narrowly. The individual, the Court held, could
block the receipt of material from a particular
mailer, but only because it was the individual making the judgment about what was indecent, and

39 CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF
FREE SPEECH xvi-xviii (Free Press) (1993).
40 Id. at xviii.

than their own).

Id. at 18-19.
See generallyJerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48
STAN. L. REv. 345 (1996) (arguing current urban policy
41

42

adopted by every level of American Government promotes
fragmentation of American cities, tends to isolate the poor,

and fosters suspicion because fewer Americans encounter
people whose cultures, values and opinions are different

43 See, e.g., NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE,
(Vintage Books) (1996).
44 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
45
Id. at 303-04.
46
Id. at 307.
47
Id. at 310.
48
397 U.S. 728 (1970).
49
Id. at 731-32.

BEING DIGITAL

179

190

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

because it was that judgment that stopped the delivery, and because the decision was limited to a
particular mailer.5 0 The power was to shut off further mailings from a particular sender; it could
not be expanded to a power to filter all mail of
the same kind.51 The state could not be used to
facilitate automatic filtering. The choice to filter
must be made, Brennan's argument suggests, by
the individual, on a per sender basis.
This disabling of government filtering gets its
strongest expression in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.52 The federal statute struck there prohibited the mailing of unsolicited advertisements
for contraceptives. The statute was defended
both because it protected the public against
speech most would find offensive, and because it
protected kids from speech that parents might
find indecent. The first ground was insufficient.
The second ground was too narrow for a statute
that regulated with this breadth. Said the Court:
"We [have] recognized the important interest in allowing addressees to give notice to a mailer that they
wish no further mailings. . . But we have never held

that the government itself can shut off the flow of mailings to protect those recipients who might potentially
3
be offended."5

The three opinions together support an argument that the government is constrained in its
power to aid individuals in their filtering of permissible speech. It can protect the right of individuals to filter; but only when the individual first
confronts what must be filtered. That burden, of
making that selection, must, this view argues, be
left with the individual. The evil here is governmental facilitation of ex ante filtering, even where
the filtering is what a majority would want. 54 As
Tribe puts it, "each householder must be left with
the right to decide what messages to receive; government cannot make this choice in gross."5 5
This view of the first amendment is inconsistent
with a technology of perfect filtering, or more
precisely, with indirect regulations that facilitate
perfect filtering. It is inconsistent with this kind
of indirect regulation, because the essence of this
view of the first amendment is that some imperId. at 734, 737.
The Court rejected a reading of the statute which
would have allowed the Postmaster General to identify the
mail "similar" to that curtailed by the householder and to
curtail delivery of the similar mail as well. Id. at 732. Under
the Court's reading of the statute, the Postmaster General's
role is limited to the issuance of the prohibitory order, and
the prosecution for violation of the order. Id. at 738
50
51
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fection is a public value. The government is limited in the aid it can give for shutting off a class of
otherwise permissible speech.
The essence of perfect filtering is that the receiver be able to turn off a class of otherwise permissible speech. Given the code regulating
speech now - given the technologies for screening speech now - that is quite difficult. The best
computers in the world cannot effectively screen
raw text, and they certainly cannot screen raw
video. Thus today, perfect ex ante filtering is impossible. There's no way perfectly to select what
one wants to see, while excluding what one
doesn't want to see, except by seeing something,
and then deciding not to see it again.
But a simple change in technology would
change all this. As Negroponte pointed out a few
years ago,5 6 the power to regulate content hangs
on whether there are labels attached to the content - whether, in other words, there is a digital
truth in labeling law. If speech were required to
carry such labels - accurately describing the content of such speech then very crude machines
could effect very sophisticated filtering. If all
transmissions were labeled, then very simple computers could screen speech that doesn't match a
selected label: Very simple computers; or very
simple chips, or we could say, V-chips, for short.
Perfect and automatic ex ante filtering is in this
way facilitated by indirect regulations that require
labeling. This is just what the V-chip statute requires directly, and what the CDA requires in effect. For the CDA, like the statute in Lamont, says
that the adult must take steps to connect to indecent speech. And the V-chip, as the statute in
Rowan could have been read, requires a kind of
labeling of speech, that facilitates ex ante screening. Both, again, are technologies facilitating
choice, because both are technologies for facilitating perfect ex ante screening.
If we are to resist these technologies, my suggestion is that the grounds for our resistance are not
libertarian. They are not grounds that affirm the
value of freedom of choice. They are instead
52
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Madisonian grounds, to adopt Sunstein-speak,
that resist perfect choice in the name of some better balance of speech.
My point is not so much to argue for these alternative grounds. It is certainly not to predict
that the Court would follow them in interpreting
the First Amendment. It is instead to suggest an
incompleteness in a choice based critique of indirect regulations of code. For if indirect regulations of code are not choice disabling, but choice
enhancing, then an individual choice-based philosophy has no grounds for resisting them. These
arguably are the effects of the current cyberspace
regulations. We need something more than libertarianism to resist them.
IV.

CONCLUSION

We have a well developed tradition for thinking
about direct regulation by law. We have a large
constitutional and statutory structure for testing
it, and limiting it. This structure arose in a context where direct regulation was laws most effective tool: Where this was where the action was,
and where this was what regulation would be.
We are entering a time when direct regulation
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by government will be one of the least important
modes of regulation; when the most important
regulations will be regulations that are less direct.
One question will then be how to carry from the
old context values important in the new. Or more
directly, how to limit, or constrain this indirect
regulation, to achieve the values that other limits
on governmental power are to yield.
This change will disorient us for a bit. It makes
sense that it will. We are not used to the power
that indirect regulation will offer; our intuitions
were built in a world where baselines were relatively fixed. This suggests that we should gain our
bearings again before speaking too boldly.
Bold speaking is what I fear about the current
arguments of cyber-libertarians (such as the
ACLU, or EFF). They have carried over directly
real space arguments about direct regulation by
law; they haven't thought through indirect regulation by code. They are pushing us to a world indeed they are encouraging it - where automatic ex ante filtering is a feature of life. But I am
not so certain that this is a feature that will make
life better. And my sense is that before it gets encoded, we need to think more about what it would
mean.

